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Abstract. The paper empirically examines the impact of freedom from regulation in 
different institutional areas on business entry rate in 10 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries over the period 1995–2007. Employing the feasible 
generalized least squares econometric approach, it discloses a positive association be-
tween business entry and the overall institutional freedom. Economic freedom in different 
institutional areas, however, does not appear to have the same importance for business 
entry. Institutional freedoms that are the most beneficial for business creation are product 
market freedom, property rights freedom, and freedom from corruption. This implies 
that simple and inexpensive administration procedures, competitive product markets, and 
transparent and effective legal/judicial system help promote business creation. Business 
entry is also positively associated with macroeconomic prosperity in terms of employ-
ment growth and the development of information and communication technology industry. 
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1. Introduction
A range of studies investigates the impact of different dimensions of entrepreneurship 
(measured by self-employment rates, Global Entrepreneur Monitor (GEM) indices, indi-
cators of business dynamics etc.) on economic performance. Regression analyses of the 
influence of business creation on economic performance mostly focus on a single coun-
try (Foster et al. 2001; Disney et al. 2003; van Stel, Suddle 2008; Fritsch, Mueller 2008; 
Acs, Mueller 2008). The list of suchlike cross-country studies (including Scarpetta et al. 
2002 and Bartelsman et al. 2004) is rather short, which is mostly due to data limitations. 
Cross-country and country-specific studies together provide convincing evidence that 
business creation positively affects economic performance in terms of total factor and 
labour productivity growth, employment growth and aggregate output growth. 
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If entrepreneurship represents one of the sources of new jobs and economic growth, it 
shall not be hindered by the institutional framework. However, to guarantee a certain 
level of income and social security, equality and protection of health in a society, gov-
ernments regulate product, labour and financial markets and impose taxes on personal 
income, business profits and other bases. High wages and taxes, strict employment 
protection legislation, strict technical standards, complicated administration procedures, 
inefficiency of the legal system in contract enforcement and underdevelopment of finan-
cial markets can distort entrepreneurial incentives (Lundström, Stevenson 2005: 253). 
Empirical studies investigating the institutional and other determinants of entrepreneur-
ship mostly measure this phenomenon by the self-employment or business ownership 
rate (Parker, Robson 2004; Kanniainen, Vesala 2005; Bruce, Mohsin 2006; Nyström 
2008; Dickson et al. 2008) or by one of the GEM indices (Bjørnskov, Foss 2008; Sobel 
et al. 2007). The list of cross-country studies analyzing institutional determinants of 
business creation is rather limited. This study attempts to fill this gap by the econometric 
investigation of the impact of (freedom from) regulation in different institutional areas 
on business entry rate in 10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries1 over the period 1995–2007. Different specifications of the general 
regression equation are estimated by the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) ap-
proach proposed by Parks (1967). The analysis is especially relevant for economic 
policymakers in continental European economies with traditionally stringent labour 
market regulation (LMR) and product market regulation (PMR), and important roles of 
government in the economy. 
The rest of the paper consists of five sections. Section 2 reviews empirical literature 
examining the determinants of business entry. Section 3 describes variables used in the 
regression analysis and their data sources. Section 4 presents a framework for economet-
ric analysis and describes the estimation approach. Results for different specifications of 
the general regression equation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review
The amount of goods, new businesses, and patents generated from a given amount of 
economic inputs depends on the rules of the game (i.e. institutions) under which entre-
preneurs operate (Sobel 2008: 645). As institutions govern the behaviour of individuals 
and businesses, they are likely to appear relevant for business dynamics. We classify 
them in the following groups: financial sector regulation, PMR, judicial system, prop-
erty rights protection legislation, LMR, and fiscal regulation.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) emphasize the importance of financial development, related 
to the ease of obtaining finance for a sound entrepreneurial project and the confidence 
with which investors anticipate an adequate return. They argue that a well-developed 
1 The set of 10 OECD countries include nine European Union (EU) countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and the United 
States.
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financial system weakens the opposition of incumbent businesses and facilitates the 
entry of newcomers. Klapper et al. (2006) empirically show for 21 European countries 
that financial sector development positively affects new business creation in sectors that 
are more dependent on external financing. Alfaro and Charlton (2010) analyse the same 
relationship using firm-level data for 98 countries referring to years 1999 and 2004. 
They find that reducing restrictions on international capital flows enhances business 
entry. Similar is found by Aghion et al. (2007) and Chavis et al. (2010). 
PMR refers to a set of regulations – the state control of business enterprises, legal 
and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to international trade and 
investment – that might restrict competition in the product markets (Conway et al. 
2006: 9). Scarpetta et al. (2002) empirically confirm a negative influence of PMR on 
business entry, especially on the entry of small and medium-sized businesses. Klapper 
et al. (2006) provide a cross-country study on the role of bureaucratic requirements to 
register a limited liability company. Using the industry-level entry rates for 3 million 
firms from 21 European countries and a sample of firms from the United States for the 
years 1998 and 1999, they show that costly entry regulations hamper the creation of new 
firms. More evidence on the adverse effect of PMR on the setting up of businesses is 
provided by Djankov et al. (2002), Desai et al. (2003) and Loayza et al. (2005). Studies 
in general conclude that detailed and costly bureaucratic processes related to licence 
and permission applications, and complicated procedure for legal registration of a busi-
ness might divert potential entrepreneurs from starting their own business. However, 
bureaucratic entry barriers have been shown to impede entry in countries with relatively 
little corruption, while in corrupt countries entry barriers can be circumvented (Djankov 
et al. 2002; Klapper et al. 2006). But corruption itself can act as a powerful barrier to 
the entry of new businesses, as shown by Campos et al. (2010).
Another factor that might affect business creation is protection of intellectual property. 
Strong patent protection, for example, excludes imitators for a certain period out of 
the market and in this way protects incumbent businesses that own the patents. Small 
entrants often do not have enough finance or intellectual capital to invent new products 
or processes and might see their business opportunity as imitators. From this perspec-
tive, strong patent protection can impede business entry. On the other hand, individuals 
might be motivated to innovate and enter the market – despite being small – if they 
know that the output of their research will be legally protected. Klapper et al. (2006: 
620) empirically show that countries with better protection of intellectual property have 
more entry in research and development (R&D) intensive industries. 
LMR in the form of employment protection laws might affect industries in different 
directions. Compliance with employment protection laws prevents a business from fir-
ing its employees or makes it costly to do so. Strong employment protection might be 
particularly costly for small businesses, which are expected to face bigger problems 
with keeping their employees through economic downturns than their larger counter-
parts do. On the other hand, employment protection laws protect employees and give 
them the confidence to join small and newly born businesses (Klapper et al. 2006: 
619–620). Scarpetta et al. (2002), Haltiwanger et al. (2006), Klapper et al. (2006) and 
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Aghion et al. (2007) provide the convincing empirical evidence that strong employment 
protection hampers the entry of small- and medium-sized firms, in particular in labour 
intensive industries. 
A study by Loayza et al. (2005), using industry-level and country-level data for the 
manufacturing sector for the United States and 12 European and Latin American coun-
tries for the period 1990–2001, confirms a negative impact of LMR on business entry 
but gives no robust evidence regarding the direction of the impact of fiscal regulation 
on firm dynamics. 
Using data for the United States over the period 1992–2001, Campbell and Rogers 
(2007) empirically confirm a positive impact of the overall level of economic freedom, 
as measured by the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index, on the rate of net busi-
ness formation. 
Our study complements the findings of reviewed studies by examining the link between 
(freedom from) regulation in different institutional areas and business creation in 10 
OECD countries over the period 1995–2007. It contributes to the policy debate on 
the effectiveness of alternative institutional settings on entrepreneurship in the form of 
business creation. 
3. Data description
To measure business creation, we employ the business entry rate (entry, in %) data from 
the International Benchmark of Entrepreneurs (IBE) database compiled by the Dutch in-
stitute EIM Business and Policy Research (EIM 2010). The IBE entry rate is calculated 
as the number of enterprise entries divided by the total number of active enterprises 
in a certain period, where an entry is defined as establishment of a new enterprise, for 
which at least one person works not less than one hour a week. The database includes 
all incorporated and unincorporated non-agricultural enterprises. 
To measure the degree of freedom and flexibility of different institutions that might af-
fect business creation, we use the Heritage Foundation’s (2011) annual data on ten sub-
indices that add up to a composite economic freedom index (EFI). We organize these 
sub-indices into six groups and arrive at the following economic freedom indicators:
– financial freedom indicator (FinFree), calculated as an unweighted average of the 
monetary freedom index and the financial freedom index;
– product market freedom indicator (ProdFree), calculated as an unweighted average 
of the business freedom index, trade freedom index and investment freedom index;
– fiscal freedom indicator (FisFree), calculated as an unweighted average of the fiscal 
freedom index and government spending index;
– labour market freedom index (LabFree);
– property rights freedom index (PropFree);
– freedom from corruption index (CorrFree). 
Each of the indicators/indices takes the value from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates the 
maximum freedom. 
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Since the Heritage Foundation (2011) has measured the labour market index only since 
2005, we decided to replace it with other measure of labour market freedom. The labour 
market freedom indicator (LabFree) used in this study is calculated as a simple aver-
age of rescaled values of three labour market indicators provided by the OECD (2010a, 
2010b, 2010c): employment protection legislation indicator (epl), trade-union density 
(tud) and the gross unemployment benefit replacement rate (ubrr). As higher values 
of these OECD indicators imply more stringent LMR, each of the indicators is first 
rescaled according to the following formula: 100*(xmax – xi)/(xmax – xmin) and then used 
as one of the components of LabFree. LabFree can therefore take the values between 
0 and 100; the closer it gets to 100, the less stringent is LMR. 
In addition to the degree of economic freedom and flexibility of institutions, business 
creation can be influenced by a set of other variables. Empirical studies of business 
dynamics (e.g. Scarpetta et al. 2002; Bartelsman et al. 2003; Brandt 2004) suggest that 
entry rates tend to be higher in services than in manufacturing industries. In our regres-
sion analysis, the industry structure is taken into account by controlling for the share of 
employment in the business service sector in total economy’s employment (eservice, in 
%). Entry rates also tend to be higher for younger industries (e.g. information and com-
munication technology − ICT). Development of ICT and other technologies is expected 
to have positive impact on economic performance of other industries of the economy 
(Ginevičius, Podvezko 2004). Positive spillover effects of ICT development may in 
turn promote business entry rate in different industries. Therefore, we add the share of 
ICT manufactures in total economy’s employment (eictman, in %) to the set of control 
variables. The data source for eictman and eservice is OECD (2009b). 
Theoretically, unemployment (unempl, in %) can have two opposite effects on business 
creation. An unemployed person may be pushed into starting his own business, which 
implies a positive impact of unemployment on the business entry rate. At the same time, 
a higher level of unemployment may reduce demand for goods and services, which in 
turn decreases the rate of business creation (Reynolds et al. 1994). The net impact of 
unemployment on business creation is theoretically ambiguous (Sutaria, Hicks 2004). 
Using Finish individual-level data, Ritsilä and Tervo (2002) show that personal unem-
ployment stimulates individuals to become self-employed, while a high national level of 
unemployment decreases the likelihood of new firm formation. We use OECD (2009a) 
data for unempl (in %). 
Bigger economies are likely to exhibit lower entry rates relative to small economies, 
since the establishment of a new branch by an existing business in another region is 
not recognized as a business entry, while it would be recognized if the region was be-
yond the international border (Eurostat-OECD 2008: 10–11). In analyzing the impact 
of institutions on business creation we thus control also for the size of population (used 
in logarithmic form, lnpop). The source of data for population (in millions) is PWT 
6.3 (Heston et al. 2009). Beside the size of population, we also control for its growth 
(popgr, in %). Sutaria and Hicks (2004), Acs and Armington (2002) and Reynolds 
(1994) suggest that population change positively affects the business entry rate. 
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Higher openness (open, in %) of a country to international trade implies higher com-
petitive pressure for businesses but at the same time offers more business opportunities 
on international product markets (Colantone, Sleuwaegen 2010). The direction of the 
impact of trade openness on business entry is a priori ambiguous. The data for openness 
are taken from PWT 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009) and express the share of total real value 
of trade − imports plus exports − in real GDP at constant prices. 
Lastly, we expect business entry to be affected by macroeconomic fluctuations. Since 
the aggregate output growth and the growth of output per capita have shown to be 
positively affected by business dynamics (Klapper et al. 2010; Loayza et al. 2005), the 
volatility of gross domestic product (per capita) is expected to be endogenous to the 
business entry equation. Employment growth seems to be less subject to endogeneity 
problems. Namely, a great share of entering businesses tends to be small relative to 
incumbents (Brandt 2004; Bartelsman et al. 2004), which means that business creation 
affects a minor share of total employment growth (Scarpetta et al. 2002). An alternative 
way of controlling for at least part of business cycle fluctuations is to take into account 
the annual change in terms of trade. The latter is calculated as a difference between 
the annual growth in the export price index (PX) and the annual growth in the import 
price index (PM): TOTch = ∆lnTOT = ∆ln(PX/PM) = ∆lnPX – ∆lnPM. Data for the 
employment growth rate (emplgr, in %) and data for import and export prices used for 
calculating TOTch (in %) are obtained from OECD (2009a, 2010c). 
4. Econometric strategy 
With the regression analysis, we aim to verify if and how selected institutional deter-
minants affect the business creation. This is done by estimating different variants of the 
general regression equation:
 entryit = α + INSit β + MVit γ + ai + εit ,  (1) 
on time-series cross-section (TSCS) data covering 10 OECD countries over the period 
1995–2007. Hereby, the subscript i denotes a country, and t stands for a time period; εit 
is the white noise error term, while ai presents country-specific effects (included when 
necessary and appropriate). The dependent variable, entry, is the business entry rate (in 
%). INS is a vector of institutions of economic freedom. MV is a vector of relevant 
macroeconomic control variables, which includes the share of ICT manufactures in 
total economy’s employment (eictman, in %), the share of business service sector in 
total economy’s employment (eservice, in %), the rate of unemployment (unempl, in 
%), trade openness (open, in %), the logarithm of the size of population (lnpop, mio), 
population growth (popgr, in %), employment growth (emplgr, in %), and the annual 
change in terms of trade (TOTch, in %).
Equation (1) is the most general variant of the regression equation. We estimate different 
specifications of equation (1) with combinations of control variables that satisfactorily 
explain the variance of the dependent variable and satisfy certain statistical properties. 
Fisher’s test for the presence of a panel unit root for the business entry rate (Maddala, 
Wu 1999) rejects the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for all considered 
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cases: driftless random walk, random walk with drift, and trend2. We may therefore 
conclude that the IBE entry rate follows a stationary process. Since many of the ex-
planatory variables are also stationary, we estimate equation (1) on original rather than 
transformed data. 
A full unconditional fixed effect (FE) regression of the business entry rate discloses 
that major part of the total variance in the business entry rate is due to country-specific 
effects. We are interested to find out to which extent these effects can be explained by 
institutional variables that vary across countries, but show little movement over time. 
Since the FE model observes only within-country data variation, the effects of time-
invariant variables on business entry will be estimated poorly due to high collinearity 
with country-specific effects. When the business entry rate is regressed solely on the 
composite index of economic freedom (IFE) and the control variables, we take into 
account country-specific effects to lower the risk of omitted variable bias. But when 
the set of explanatory variables includes different institutions of economic freedom, 
country-specific effects are omitted. 
While the basic random effect (RE) model and FE model can be very useful for panel 
data, they do not deal with the important issues of heterogeneity in TSCS data. Namely, 
our dataset might suffer from autocorrelation, groupwise heteroskedasticity, and cross-
sectional dependence. The diagnostic checks3 for chosen variants of the regression 
equation (1) show that our data significantly violate the assumptions of autocorrelation 
and (groupwise) homoskedasticity. Accordingly, we estimate the regression equation (1) 
taking the FGLS approach proposed by Parks (1967) that corrects the standard errors 
for autocorrelation of order 1 (AR(1)), and groupwise heteroskedasticity. 
To make sure that unemployment, as an explanatory variable, does not suffer from 
the endogeneity problem4, we perform the Granger (1969) test of (non)causality. The 
results5 suggest that business entry does not Granger cause unemployment but rather 
than the other way around. 
5. Description and interpretation of the econometric results
Table 1 reports the estimation results for six specifications of the general regression 
equation, where macroeconomic fluctuation is measured by the employment growth 
rate. The estimation of comparable variants of equation (1) that use percentage change 
in terms of trade as a proxy for macroeconomic fluctuation yield similar estimates of 
the regression coefficients of institutional variables6. 
2 The results of Fisher’s test are available from the authors upon request.
3 The results of the test of autocorrelation in the error term and modified Wald statistic for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in TSCS FGLS regression model (Baum 2001; Greene 2003: 598) confirm the pres-
ence of both AR(1) and groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of all variants of equation (1).
4 We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out the endogeneity problem and suggesting additional 
testing.
5 The results are available from the authors upon request.
6 The results are available from the authors upon request.
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The results in Table 1 suggest that overall economic freedom (EFI) significantly posi-
tively affects business creation. The estimated regression coefficients suggest that in-
creasing the EFI from 60.2 to 78.0 (which is analogue to moving from France with 
the lowest EFI to the United States with the highest EFI) increases the business entry 
rate by 1.7 to 2.6 percentage point (depending on the variant of the model). Since the 
composite economic freedom index gives little specific information that is useful for 
economic policy makers, we break it down into indicators of freedom in specific insti-
tutional areas. 
Product market freedom (ProdFree) significantly positively affects business entry. The 
results suggest that increasing ProdFree from 52.7 (which is the lowest value in the 
group reached by France) to 61.7 (which is the highest freedom in the group reached by 
Ireland) increases the business entry rate by about 1 percentage point. The direction of the 
impact corresponds to the findings of Klapper et al. (2006) and Scarpetta et al. (2002). 
Table 1. Results of the regression analysis 
Explanatory
variables:
Regression equation specification; Dependent variable: entry
(1) (1) + FE (2) (2) + FE (3) (4) (5) (6)
EFI 0.1426*** 0.0952*** 0.1440*** 0.0935***
ProdFree 0.1080*** 0.1067*** 0.0967*** 0.0955***
FinFree 0.0113 0.0129 0.0148 0.0141
FisFree 0.0015 –0.0002
ProperFree 0.0394** 0.0399** 0.0437** 0.0429**
CorrFree 0.0123* 0.0126** 0.0145** 0.0143**
LabFree 0.0198 0.0224
eservice –0.1859** –0.0738 –0.2188*** –0.1110 –0.2223*** –0.2368*** –0.2720*** –0.2648***
eictman 0.9317* 0.9174 1.0294** 1.0419* 1.0691* 1.1068* 0.8937* 0.8574
unempl –0.2229*** –0.0407 –0.2386*** –0.0405 –0.3269*** –0.3341*** –0.3522*** –0.3443***
lnpop –0.2062 –1.7825 0.0841 –0.0531
open 0.0043 0.0061 –0.0019 0.0006
popgr 1.0390 2.2721** 0.9978 2.2600** 1.0921* 1.1072* 0.8796 0.8671
emplgr 0.1176* 0.1308** 0.1211** 0.1338** 0.1536** 0.1540** 0.1707*** 0.1648**
constant 9.1308** 19.8658 7.9256** 4.0823 7.7190* 7.2581 9.1177* 9.4949*



















Note: The equations are estimated by FGLS approach. + FE denotes that the model includes the fixed 
(country-specific) effects. Standard errors are adjusted for groupwise heteroskedasticity and common 
AR(1). Correcting the standard errors for panel-specific AR(1) gives similar results.
* Regression coefficient is significant at the 10% (2-tailed), ** Regression coefficient is significant at 
the 5% (2-tailed), *** Regression coefficient is significant at the 1% (2-tailed).
Source: Own estimation.
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Protection of property rights (ProperFree) significantly positively affects business entry. 
The estimates of the regression coefficient suggest that increasing ProperFree from 66.7 
(reached by Italy with the least protected or humble property rights) to 90.0 (which is 
the value reached in seven countries with the highest protection of property rights in the 
group) increases the business entry rate by about 1 percentage point. A positive impact 
of protection of property rights is in line with the results of the study by Klapper et al. 
(2006). It suggest that entering businesses gain more from the protection of property 
rights arising from innovation and business entry than they lose due to being excluded 
as imitators for a certain period out of the market. 
Freedom from corruption (CorrFree) significantly positively affects business entry (as 
previously shown by Campos et al. 2010) but the effect appears to be modest. Increas-
ing the value of the freedom from corruption index from the lowest value in the group 
reached by Italy (51.6) to the highest value in the group reached by Denmark (95.2) 
increases the business entry rate by 0.5 to 0.6 percentage point. 
Labour market freedom indicator (LabFree) and financial freedom index (FinFree) 
have positive but small regression coefficients, which are statistically insignificant. The 
regression coefficient of the index of fiscal freedom (FisFree) is insignificant with un-
stable sign. 
The results suggest that the service sector employment share (eservice) negatively af-
fects business entry. This result is at odds with the stylized fact that business entry is 
higher in service than manufacturing sector presented by Scarpetta et al. (2002) and 
Brandt (2004). In line with the results of the latter studies, the share of ICT manu-
factures in total economy’s employment (eictman) significantly positively affects the 
business entry rate. 
The unemployment rate (unempl) shows a negative influence on business entry, as sug-
gested by Ritsilä and Tervo (2002). This result implies that at the macro level the pull 
effect of unemployment on business creation prevails over the push effect. Employment 
growth that serves as a proxy for macroeconomic movements significantly positively 
affects the business entry rate. 
The size of population (lnpop) shows a negative impact on the business entry rate as 
suggested by Eurostat-OECD (2008: 10–11), but the regression coefficient does not ap-
pear to be statistically significant. As previously found by Sutaria and Hicks (2004), Acs 
and Armington (2002) and Reynolds (1994), the growth in population (popgr) positively 
affects the business entry rate. The sign of this impact is stable, but the significance 
parameter lacks robustness. 
Lastly, the regression coefficient pertaining to trade openness (open) is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. This is at least partly because the ProdFree index comprises a 
measure of obstacles to international trade and thus already explains a part of variation 
in the business entry rate related to trade openness. 
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6. Conclusions
The results of the regression analysis, using TSCS data for 10 OECD countries over the 
period 1995–2007, corroborate theoretical hypothesis that freedom from regulation in 
general positively affects business creation. Economic freedom in different institutional 
areas, however, does not appear to have the same importance for business entry. 
In line with previous research, we find a positive impact of product market freedom or, 
inversely, a negative impact of PMR on business entry. The results, however, do not im-
ply that countries should deregulate their product markets in all directions. The decision 
on the withdrawal of a certain legal act regulating the production and trade of a certain 
good shall be made based on the comparison of the benefits of such regulation for the 
society and its costs in terms of lower business incentives, time and money wasted 
by firms on complicated administrative procedures, and the additional operational and 
transaction costs due to larger administrative apparatus.
Estimation results also disclose that the protection of property rights positively affects 
business entry, which supports the prevailing findings from previous studies. This is the 
only type of regulation that appears beneficial for business start-ups. It assures owners 
and investors that their property rights will be respected and protects innovators against 
copying or imitation (at least) within their country. 
We find no evidence on the significant impact of financial, labour market and fiscal 
freedom on the business entry rate. In line with expectations, corruption is shown to 
have a modest negative impact on business creation. 
The main results of the study are robust and in general match theoretical expectations 
and previous empirical evidence but are subject to few limitations. Employed institu-
tional indicators are based on surveys and thus at least partly reflect subjective judge-
ment of respondents. Furthermore, the use of country-level data does not enable to 
completely capture the industry structure of the economies and to unravel responses to 
regulations at the industry level. Finally, the study provides policy-makers with recom-
mendations on the direction of development in the main economic institutional areas 
but says little about the how process of deregulation should be governed. These are the 
issues that shall be addressed in further research. 
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